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1 Introduction
During the 1990s, governments in developing
countries began to carry out wide-reaching reforms
of the way public services such as health and
education are delivered. New Public Management
(NPM) heavily influenced the reform agenda that has
emerged, in part as a result of the influence of
international actors such as the World Bank and
bilateral donors. An important component of NPM,
drawn in part from social choice theory, that made
its way into the reforms is the emphasis placed on
empowering end-users as agents of accountability.
This article argues the abstract notion of end-users
of public services found in NPM-inspired reforms –
either that of generic (maximising) individuals or
undifferentiated households – is mistaken, making
invisible the particular agents who in reality access
public services on behalf of the household. Worse, it
hides the constraints these agents face when seeking
access to such services, which can limit their efficacy
as agents of accountability.
In this article, I argue that it is overwhelmingly
women who access and use public services to meet
household needs, despite differences in women’s
societal position across regions of the world. Women
tend to have greater responsibility in the household
division of labour for education, health, clothing and
food of the members. Men’s roles are seen as
ensuring the economic stability of the family. Rather
than generic agents, women face power relations
within the household and within the community that
constrain their ability to voice household needs or
exercise the best choices in the service marketplace.
In addition, the article presents compelling evidence
that the gender of who obtains social benefits
matters both for the overall wellbeing of the
household and for women and girls particularly.
Gender power relations influence the way decisions
are formulated both at the household level as well as
within the community. Reformers need to take
gender power relations into consideration in the
design of service delivery reforms, particularly if they
are betting on women as important agents of
accountability. If women are to be important agents
of accountability, they have to become visible in the
design of service delivery reforms.
Given the limitations that women can face when
acting individually, this article takes one further step
and explores the role of collective action in
strengthening their voice. Collective action has often
led to strengthening of the voice of a particular
group at the local, national and international level.
However, this article finds that women face a
specific set of obstacles to collective action that
make constructing collective voice, for example by
participating in social movements, more difficult.
Data on women and social policy is generally sparse
in middle- and low-income countries, and there is
very little research on the impact of recent reforms
on women’s voice and choice. This article is an
attempt to bridge some of this research gap.
2 Intra-household power relations
Very few public services reforms explicitly take into
account the power relations that exist within
households. The design of public services is often
based on the assumption that individual or
household decisions conform to neo-classical
economic theory (Beall and Kanji 1999; Kabeer 1994;
Evans 1989). Here, the household is viewed as a
single entity and treated as a unit of analysis (Kabeer
1994; Becker 1981). In urban household surveys, ‘the
household’ is often used to assess how the aggregate
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public accumulates, spends, or uses and experiences
housing, infrastructure and urban services (Beall and
Kanji 1999: 4). In the case of NPM, Batley (2004: 32)
argues, this conception of the household as an
undifferentiated (utility maximising) unit is put at the
service of ‘the reduction of governments’ direct role
in managing economies and providing service; a
greater reliance on markets, communities and
individuals to manage services; adoption by
governments of new roles of ‘steering’ (setting policy
frameworks, regulating and supporting) service
providers rather than providing directly; and the
reform of public management to create incentives
for efficiency and effectiveness’. The justification of
the NPM reforms in service delivery has been to
enhance the leverage of individual users vis-à-vis
providers through voice and choice reforms, ensuring
greater accountability and responsiveness by service
providers.
There is a wide range of literature that has
questioned the neo-classical construction of the
household. However, despite the existence of a wide
body of literature NPM reforms have failed to take
into consideration gender power relations. New
Household Economics (pioneered by Gary Becker in
the 1960s) emerged to challenge the neo-classical
account highlighting the importance of production
within the household (Becker 1974, 1981). In the new
household economic model, all resources are pooled
and distributed in an altruistic manner by a
benevolent male household head to maximise the
welfare of household members. Marxist theory
according to Folbre (1986: 254) has also portrayed
household relationships as reciprocal and
characterised by consensus rather than conflict.
Gender analysts, particularly feminist anthropologists
and economists, have demonstrated that this
characterisation of the household is naïve and
ignores gender and power imbalances and conflict
within the household (Kabeer 1994; Evans 1989).1
Intra-household allocation of resources refers to the
dynamics of how different resources that are
generated within, or which come into the household
are controlled and accessed by different members
(Baden and Reeves 2000: 24). Gender analysis has
revealed evidence of bias against female members of
households in the allocation of resources such as
income, food nutrition, healthcare and education.
Katz (1997: 25) observes that research on household
bargaining models shows that women, in
comparison to men, do not have equal power to
voice their needs, nor equal ability to exit from
households that do not meet their needs.
Nonetheless, these patterns are not universal and are
often mediated by other factors such as age and
birth order (Baden and Reeves 2000: 24). In South
Asia, nutritional bias against girls has been more
widely noted than in Latin America.
Deeply influential in this field of intra-household
bargaining models is the work of Amartya Sen (1990)
who has argued that the access to different
household goods is determined by bargaining in the
context of cooperative conflict. Sen (1990) argues
that households are formed and sustained so long as
members have more to gain from being within them
than outside. There are a number of variables that
will strengthen women’s voice and therefore
influence over household distribution of resources.
Sen (1999: 191–2) identifies women’s ability to earn
an independent income, to find employment outside
the home, to have ownership rights and education
as key variables in affecting women’s agency.
Through working outside the home and earning an
independent income, women’s social standing both
within the household as well as in society more
broadly, will improve. The contribution to the family
prosperity is more visible and her voice will be
strengthened in resource allocation because she will
be less dependent on other members of the
household. Outside employment often has useful
‘educational’ affects, in terms of exposure to the
world outside the household, making her agency
more effective. Similarly, the education of women
increases their agency, by providing more
information and skills. The ownership of property can
also give women more power in family decisions. As
a result of such factors, how much say women have
over resource allocation at the household level can
vary even within the same region in households with
the same income.
There is considerable research showing that the way
resources enter the household has an effect on
resource allocation within households. Lundberg et al.
(1997) used the changes in the UK welfare system in
the late 1970s to test how the gender of the welfare
recipient can affect intra-household resource allocation.
In Britain prior to 1977, public transfers for child benefits
were paid to households through the tax system. Their
financial entitlement was deducted from income tax
accrued to the father. The welfare system was then
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remodelled replacing the tax deduction with a cash
transfer to the mother. The study shows that there was
a coincident change in the expenditure pattern: relative
to men’s clothing, expenditures on women and
children’s clothing increased. They conclude that the
shift in power within the household did affect
allocation of resources, strengthening the women’s in
decision making.
Thomas (1997) found that in Brazil, additional income
placed in the hands of women in poorer households
resulted in a greater share of the household budget
being devoted to health, education, and nutrition
related expenditure. And Kanbur and Haddad (1994)
found that when US$10 was given to the female in
the household, rather than her husband, spending on
alcohol and tobacco was reduced in favour of
children’s health and education.
Therefore, the way a government injects money into
a family can have important implications for resource
allocation and by extension the wellbeing of
individuals within the household.
In Latin America, minimum income guarantee and
conditional cash transfer programmes are among the
few examples of new social welfare policies that
have operationalised intra-household resource
distribution (Braine 2006). Mexico’s Oportunidades,
for example, seeks to empower women in
beneficiary targeted households. It is made up of
three components: educational grants to facilitate
and encourage school attendance at elementary and
high school levels; provision of basic healthcare
services as well as public health talks; and monetary
transfers and nutritional supplements to enhance the
nutritional status of women and children in targeted
households. Only women are entitled to receive the
programme’s cash transfer. Rubalcava et al. (2002)
argue that Oportunidades, by placing the benefits in
the hands of women, allows more resources to be
allocated towards girls’ and boys’ clothing, and less to
expenditures on adult male goods, such as male
clothing. The authors found that women with more
power tended to allocate more resources towards
what they perceive as an improvement of the dietary
condition of their household members. They
conclude that welfare programmes that explicitly
incorporate into their design operational rules to
enhance the status of women may indeed affect the
bargaining power of women within the household
as manifest in household allocation decisions.
Oportunidades has become the largest programme
in the federal budget, growing from 9 million pesos
(US$0.82 billion) in 2000 to 33 billion pesos
(US$2.99 billion) in 2006. Five million families (or
25 million people) currently participate (Braine 2006).
3 The case of healthcare reform
Globally, health policies have gone through dramatic
shifts over the past three decades. The debates and
subsequent policy approaches towards health service
provision have been heavily influenced by economic
trends (Oxaal and Cook 1998: 14). In the 1970s, there
was a comprehensive focus on primary healthcare.
By the 1980s, in the face of economic crisis,
recession and structural adjustment policies, health
policy moved towards more selective interventions
and cost recovery mechanisms became the norm.
Neither of these waves of reforms has taken into
account women’s position within the household and
how gender power relations influence the demand
for health. As evidence in this section suggests, the
reforms have had a differential effect on men and
women.
The widespread response to adjustment and public
sector retrenchment has been health sector reform
along the principles laid out in the World
Development Report 1993 (Oxaal and Cook 1998: 15).
The health sector reform advocated in the report
consisted of a ‘package of policies for the financing
and provision of services, emphasising cost-
effectiveness through the provision of relatively low-
cost, high-impact interventions, such as public health
programmes, increasing efficiency through
competition between providers and greater private
sector provision, and the introduction of cost-
recovery mechanisms such as user fees, pre-payment
and insurance’ (Oxaal and Cook 1998: 16). Despite the
background of economic crisis, the objective of
universal coverage was retained in principle (World
Bank 1993). However, this was to be achieved by
‘making more efficient use of available resources
through institutional reforms and widening the
range of financing options and institutional players
who provide healthcare’ (Standing 1997: 4).
3.1 Differential gender costs of user fees
Global blueprints have been advocated by agencies
such as the World Bank to promote privatisation of
health service providers and to increase funding via
user fees of public providers (Whitehead et al.
2001: 833). This is further reinforced by the World
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Trade Organization (WTO), a body that in recent
years has promoted commercial interests through
striving to open up public services to foreign
investors and markets. Introduction of user fees for
public services has become common in many
developing countries. This was usually as part of an
ascribed health policy package, which in turn was
one component of common macroeconomic
structural adjustment programmes for countries
facing debt (Whitehead et al. 2001: 833).
The introduction of user charges has had an adverse
affect on some of the poorest people in the world
and the most affected are likely to be girls and
women.2 This is because demand for girls’ and
women’s education and health is more price elastic
than men’s and boys (World Bank 2001: 151).
Furthermore, household demand for girls’ education
and health is often more sensitive to price changes
than for boys. In their study of user fees Alderman
and Gertler (1997) found that among low-income
households in Pakistan a decrease in the price of
doctor’s services would increase female use by 57 per
cent more than male use. Research in West Africa
found that puzzling responses to the introduction of
user charges for health services reflected the fact
that women and men have responsibility for
different types of household expenditure. Asking
men if they are prepared to pay for health services
when this is customarily an item of female family
expenditure, has provided little insight into aggregate
household demand or sustained ‘willingness to pay’
(Orubuloye et al. 1991).
While the World Bank has highlighted the importance
of improving women’s health outcomes, in particular
by raising women’s education, the push for cost
recovery mechanisms appears to go in the opposite
direction and represents a common failure to take
intra-household power differentials into account.
3.2 Decentralisation and women’s voice
Since the mid-1980s, more than 60 governments in
developing countries have experimented with some
form of decentralisation (Crook and Manor 2000: 2).
In many countries, decentralisation has prompted
shifts in approaches to service delivery that have
provided wider spaces for citizen involvement
(Cornwall and Gaventa 2001: 32). Pressure from local
and national civil society as well as the development
establishment has meant that decentralisation of
service delivery has almost always been accompanied
by participatory mechanisms. This form of democratic
decentralisation can increase the political space
available for citizens to articulate their priorities and
pursue their needs at the neighbourhood, city, or
district, and state or provincial levels. Democratic
decentralisation can also provide scope for local
government to respond more promptly and flexibly to
local needs and priorities, and to raise revenue locally
which can be used to improve services resulting in
more efficient government (Rakodi 2002: 16).
Despite the potential for greater citizen voice –
particularly those who have often been marginalised
from policy processes – there is a body of literature
that questions participation and how democratic it is
in reality (Cornwall and Gaventa 2001; Chambers
1997; Frazer 1989). Local communities are not
homogenous but instead contain a variety of groups
and interests, and are often characterised by complex
power dynamics. Gender, ethnicity, age, nationality
and class may all have a bearing on whose voice is
heard in the public arena. The voices of the socially
excluded, particularly women may not be heard in a
community setting. Rakodi (2002: 16) argues ‘that
conflicts between interests, marginalisation of
groups such as women or young people, and undue
influence on political agendas by powerful business
interests are as, if not more, intense at the local
level’. Political forces and opinions particularly in
regard to women’s position within society are often
stronger at the local than at the national level. This
could lead to women’s needs – particularly their
reproductive needs – left unmet. There is a wide
research gap on the impact of decentralisation and
women’s voice.
The healthcare system in Brazil is decentralised to the
lowest administrative tier of the federal government:
the municipality. In their study of 45 municipal health
systems, Atkinson and Haran (2004) found that
decentralisation was associated with improved
performance, but this was only shown in five of their
22 performance indicators. They concluded that
good management practices led to responsive
decentralised local health systems rather than vice
versa. ‘Any apparent association between
decentralization and performance seems to be an
artefact of the informal management and wider
political culture in which a local health system is
embedded’ (Atkinson and Haran 2004: 822).
Emmett’s study (2006) found that in Kerala
devolution of health sector decisions to the local
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level have led to policies that reflect women’s needs.
The effect of these decisions has been reinforced by
a strong civil society who have strongly vocalised
needs, particularly those of more marginalised
citizens (Emmett 2006: 76). Besley et al. (2004)
explored representation at the local level in India and
found that if the leadership of a locally elected village
government in India is reserved for a scheduled caste
or tribe member (SC/ST), then SC/ST households
residing in the group of villages represented are
more likely to receive targeted welfare transfers. In a
study of villages in the states of West Bengal and
Rajasthan, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2001) found
that villages with women leaders elected as a
consequence of mandated political reservations in
village governing bodies are more likely to invest in
public goods that, interviews revealed, women
prioritise – water, fuel and roads (as it provides
employment) and less likely to invest in education.
The findings of the last two articles do not
necessarily highlight the success of decentralisation,
but rather of political reservations at any level of
government in environments where there are
substantial social pressures operating against the
political participation of particular groups. Taken
together, the work on political reservations and
village decentralisation in India suggests that
traditionally disadvantaged groups that receive new
democratic privileges tend to exert pressure to shift
resources out of education and into other targeted
public goods that provide immediate benefit
specifically to their group (Ahmad et al. 2005: 19).
While this suggests that political decentralisation
coupled with political reservations indeed succeeds in
giving greater voice to the disadvantaged groups, it is
also indicative of problems in the public provision of
education services (Ahmad et al. 2005: 19).
Transferring power and administrative responsibility
for service delivery from the national to the local
level can lead to policy decisions that reflect the
needs of local people, but it can also lead to
inhibiting women’s voice in health-related decision
making. Where decentralisation has worked
effectively there has been a strong civil society which
has pressured policymakers to ensure that
marginalised groups are taken into consideration. This
article will now turn to examine the role of women’s
movements in ensuring women’s voices are heard in
debates around service delivery policies.
4 Women’s collective action and service delivery
Women’s movements have had important
repercussions for women’s rights and access to
health, education, and other public services. Emmett
(2006) cites women’s movements in Kerala, South
India and the Philippines as playing a significant role
in ensuring that service providers respond to
women’s needs. Where responsibility for service
delivery has been devolved to the local level they can
also counteract some of the more conservative
opinions. By articulating their needs collectively
women have been more successful in gaining
recognition for their rights not just at the global
level but at the national and community level as well.
There is a wide scholarship on women’s movements
(Basu 1995; Waylen 1994; Katzenstein and Mueller
1987; Mohanty 1991; Nelson and Chowdhury 1994;
Molyneux 1998; Threlfall 1996; Wieringa 1995).
Comparative research on these movements, which
have proliferated across the world, shows wide
variation in their composition – race, class and
ideological orientation – and their objectives,
strategies, and effectiveness (Molyneux 1998: 221).
What constitutes a ‘women’s movement’ in the
global context is almost impossible to define, and the
subject of considerable debate. Here I focus broadly
on women’s collective action that aims to influence
the provision of public services.
Historically, social movements have played an
important part in shaping social policy by pressuring
the state for an array of public services (Skocpol
1992). The labour movements in particular have
played a vital role in creating the welfare state. As
Cornwall and Gaventa (2001) point out, many of the
national liberation movements in the global South
included concerns about equality of access to
education and healthcare. While defining women’s
social movements remains problematic, few social
movements have flourished in as many parts of the
world as women’s movements (Basu 1995: 1).
Women’s collective action has had a particularly
strong impact on global policy debates. Women’s
activism for rights, equality, and policies that enhance
human development and justice for all has been one
of the most successful instances of global citizen
action (Mukhopadhyay 2003: 3). Women’s
constituencies have emerged as global citizens,
arguing for the right to development, freedom from
domestic and sexual violence, sexual and
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reproductive rights, and the application of the
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the
Beijing Platform for Action (Mukhopadhyay 2003: 3).
These global policies are the result of three decades
of sustained pressure by women’s movements within
the UN, which has led to women’s rights being
recognised as human rights on the global agenda. At
the national level, women’s collective action has
played an important role in constructing social
assistance policies for people outside of the formal
labour market, as well as influencing health and
education policies. At the local level, where rapid
urbanisation has taken place without infrastructure
and services, poor women’s movements have been
at the forefront of struggles for services such as
water, sewers, electricity, health centres, childcare
facilities and transportation (Rodriguez 1994: 32).
4.1 Particularities of women’s collective action
and voice
Collective action is rarely easy and despite the
important historical examples of influential women’s
movements, in many contexts women face a
particular set of obstacles to collective action that
men do not. Among the gender-specific obstacles
that appear to be almost universal in the global
South, two have been particularly important
constrains on women’s ability to express collective
voice: the time pressure women face and the social
norms that define their role in the public sphere.
Women’s household responsibilities, such as for
childcare and domestic work, especially if there are
also work commitments outside the home, pose a
significant obstacle to participation in collective
action (Kaufman 1991). Because many of these
household responsibilities are fulfilled at times of the
day considered ‘free-time’ for men who work – that
is, meals and childcare in the evenings, domestic and
other chores on weekends, etc. – they are less able
to participate fully in community or movement
meetings, which are typically scheduled in the
evenings or on weekends.
Gender social norms can pose even greater obstacles
to women’s collective action. If, for example, meetings
are held in bars late at night and social norms dictate
that women should not be present in such public
spaces, then women have less opportunity to become
involved in collective action. A more extreme example
of a constraining social norm, which affects women’s
ability to participate, is when women are prohibited
from going out in public without an accompanying
male member of the family. Hence Kaufman (1991)
points out that the demands on women’s time and
such social norms, and the resultant limitations on
women’s participation, ‘is a story repeated throughout
the world and forms the single major impediment to
women’s participation in political organisations’.
Survey data collected in Mexico City, Delhi and São
Paulo show that in each of these cities women are
considerably less likely to participate in associational life
than men (Houtzager et al. 2007; Harriss 2005).
Intra-household power dynamics can also affect
women’s ability to participate in social movements.
In Costa Rica, where a squatters’ housing movement
arose during the 1980s, land was occupied and the
government was pressed to give squatters land and
supplies to build modest houses (Kaufman 1991). In
the months or years of organising leading up to an
occupation, and in subsequent negotiations with
politicians and civil servants, women played an
increasingly important role in many communities.
Many occupations were backed by roadblocks of key
highways – roadblocks staffed by women and
children that lasted only a day at a time until the
government agreed to negotiate. Despite this role
played by women, some men placed limits – or tried
to – on their wives’ participation. They were jealous
of their wives going to town with another man from
the community or meeting, and possibly having a
meal with, a politician or bureaucrat (Kaufman 1991).
Rodriguez (1994: 38) cites women reporting
increased levels of domestic violence when they
were involved in urban movements.
The point here is not that women do not participate
in collective action, but rather that it cannot be
assumed that their voice will emerge in response to
simple institutional mechanisms, such as local
participatory councils. As Kaufman (1991) points out,
one of the characteristics of many community-based,
grassroots movements of popular power is the high
percentage of women among the active
membership. Reforms that seek to enhance voice as
an accountability mechanism need to take the
different types of obstacles women face to collective
action. At this stage, policymakers in fact have little
material to work with. Far more research, or perhaps
more syntheses of what we currently know, is
needed on the particular obstacles to women’s
collective action or voice.
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There is, however, good research on social
movements in general that suggests that differences
in the organisation of the state and in the design of
public policies more specifically, can facilitate or
inhibit the expression of such collective voice (Garay
2007; Houtzager 2003; Tarrow 1998). In the
literature on women’s movements it has been widely
recognised that political opportunity is a strong
factor in affecting whether women form
movements (Molyneux 1998; Goetz and Hassim
2003; Basu 1995; Waylen 1994). Basu points out that
‘a much more important influence on women’s
movements than the level of [economic]
development is the extent of state control. Women’s
movements tend to be weak where state control
permeates civil society and strong where state is or
has been relaxed’ (Basu 1995: 2). More specific and
contextual research on how the institutional design
of particular policies can facilitate women’s voice,
however, is needed if we expect service delivery
reforms to address the obstacles to women’s
collective action.
5 Conclusion
Women have been invisible agents in recent service
delivery reforms because policymakers and their
advisers tend to see end-users as generic agents of
accountability. Across cultures, however, it is women
who overwhelmingly access public services on behalf
of the household, and these women face constraints
on their agency that are quite distinct from those
men face. If women are to play a substantial role in
holding public service providers accountable, then
the design of service delivery reforms needs to pay
far greater attention to countering gender power
relations in the household and community that limit
the agency of women. In programmes where design
features seek to enhance women’s agency, such as in
Oportunidades and Bolsa Família, the results appear
to have been highly positive.
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Notes
1 The term ‘gender’ in this article refers to how a
person’s biology is culturally valued and
interpreted into locally accepted ideas of what it
is to be a woman or a man (Baden and Reeves
2000: 1). Gender relations are socially constructed
rather than derived from biology.
2 One study of 39 developing countries found that
the introduction of user fees had increased
revenues only slightly while significantly reducing
the access of low-income people to basic social
services (Whitehead et al. 2001: 833).
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